Business email compromise, the scheme behind most fake invoice scams, keeps growing year over year. Between December 2022 and December 2023, identified global exposed losses rose 9% according to the FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center, and the year before that, losses climbed even faster, up 17% between December 2021 and December 2022 according to an earlier FBI IC3 advisory. The pattern is the same every time: an invoice arrives that looks exactly like it came from a supplier you already pay, with a bank account that quietly changed.

How a fake invoice reaches your inbox

Most fake invoice scams start with reconnaissance, not forgery. A scammer either compromises a supplier’s email account or spoofs its domain closely enough to pass a quick glance — swapping a lowercase ‘l’ for an ‘i’, or adding a hyphen that most readers skim past. From inside or beside that trusted thread, they study real invoice formats: logo, tone, payment terms, even the name of the accounts payable contact who usually replies. Once the pattern is learned, they send a near-identical invoice, often timed to match a recurring payment cycle, with one change buried in the fine print: a new bank account number, sometimes paired with a note explaining the business ‘switched banks’ or is ‘updating payment details for compliance reasons.’ Because everything else matches what accounts payable expects, the invoice clears normal review. The money moves, and by the time the real supplier calls asking why they haven’t been paid, the funds are already gone. In larger organizations, the same tactic often targets a specific person rather than a shared inbox — a finance assistant or bookkeeper whose name and role the scammer found on a company website or a LinkedIn profile, which lets the fake invoice arrive addressed by name, referencing a real project or purchase order number, making it read as routine correspondence rather than an anomaly worth questioning. Smaller businesses aren’t spared either: a one-person studio paying a handful of recurring vendors is often an easier target precisely because there’s no second set of eyes reviewing payment changes before they go through.

A typical exchange, reconstructed for illustration

Illustrative scenario, built to show how the pattern typically unfolds — not an account of a real event or company.

An office manager at a small design studio receives an invoice from a printing vendor the studio has used for two years. The layout, logo, and invoice number sequence all match prior bills exactly. The only difference is a short line near the bottom: ‘Please note our bank has changed — new details below.’ The amount is ordinary, close to what the studio usually pays that vendor, so nothing about it triggers suspicion on sight. The office manager updates the saved payment details and processes the transfer the same afternoon. Three weeks later, the real vendor emails asking why the invoice is overdue, and it becomes clear the bank-change notice never came from them at all — it came from an inbox built to look like theirs for exactly this moment. Looking back, the studio’s bookkeeper notices a detail she missed the first time: the sending domain used a zero where the real vendor’s domain used the letter O, a difference so small it was invisible at a glance on a phone screen, and completely unnoticeable in a design that otherwise matched the vendor’s usual template line for line.

How to check an invoice before you pay it

The fix isn’t suspicion toward every email — it’s a short, repeatable verification step applied to anything that changes payment details, no matter how routine the request looks. Build this into the payment process itself, not into individual judgment calls made under time pressure. None of these steps are complicated, but they only work if they’re applied every time, including the tenth invoice from a vendor you’ve paid without issue for years — that familiarity is exactly what the scam is designed to exploit.

Call the supplier on a number you already have

Never use a phone number listed in the invoice or the email signature — it may belong to the scammer. Pull the number from a past contract, a previous paid invoice, or the supplier’s official website typed in directly, and ask them to confirm the bank details verbally before you send anything. If the person who normally handles billing isn’t available, wait for them rather than accepting confirmation from someone unfamiliar with the account — scammers sometimes follow up a fake invoice with a fake phone call to a number they control if you mention you’re trying to verify.

Treat any bank-change notice as a red flag by default

Legitimate businesses rarely change bank accounts, and when they do, they almost never announce it exclusively through an invoice email. Any message pairing a payment request with a ‘new account’ note deserves a direct confirmation call, every single time, regardless of how convincing the formatting looks. A genuine bank change is also usually accompanied by other communication — a letter, a notice during a phone call, or an update mentioned in an ongoing conversation — not a detail buried in the fine print of a routine bill.

Check the sender’s domain character by character

Compare the sending address against a previous, confirmed email from the same supplier — not from memory. Look for swapped letters, added hyphens, or a different top-level domain. Many email clients display a friendly name instead of the full address by default, so tap or hover to reveal it before trusting it. On a phone, this often means pressing and holding the sender’s name rather than just glancing at it, since the small screen hides exactly the detail that matters.

Require a second person to approve payment detail changes

Any update to a vendor’s bank information should need sign-off from someone other than the person who received the request. This single step breaks the urgency the scam depends on, since it forces a pause and a second set of eyes before money moves. Even in a very small team, this can be as simple as a short rule: no bank detail change goes live without a reply-back confirmation from a second phone number or a second person who also knows the vendor.

Why a password manager belongs in this defense

Fake invoice scams usually start with a compromised inbox, either yours or your supplier’s. Attackers who get into accounts payable email, or into a vendor’s billing system, often got there through a reused or weak password found in a previous breach. A password manager closes that specific door: it generates a unique, long password for every account tied to payments, invoicing, and supplier portals, so a leak at one service can’t be replayed to unlock another. Many password managers also store encrypted notes, which is a practical place to keep verified supplier phone numbers and confirmed bank details, separate from the inbox a scammer might already be watching. Combined with built-in breach monitoring that flags when a work email address shows up in a leaked dataset, it turns password hygiene from a vague best practice into a concrete check you can run before approving a payment. None of this replaces calling the supplier to confirm a change, but it removes one of the easiest ways scammers get the access that makes a convincing fake invoice possible in the first place. It’s also worth being honest about what a password manager can’t do: it won’t stop a scam that starts entirely on the supplier’s side, where your own accounts were never touched, and it won’t catch a lookalike domain on its own. It’s one layer in a defense that still depends on the verification call being made every time.

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